**Report: Out of control**

14. januar, 2020

In this report, we demonstrate how every time we use our phones, a large number of shadowy entities that are virtually unknown to consumers are receiving personal data about our interests, habits, and behaviour.

As we move around on the internet and in the real world, we are being continually tracked and profiled for the purpose of showing targeted advertising. In this report, we demonstrate how every time we use our phones, a large number of shadowy entities that are virtually unknown to consumers are receiving personal data about our interests, habits, and behaviour.

[](https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/out-of-control-mobil-650x433-liten-.jpg)

Illustrasjon: Forbrukerrådet

The actors, who are part of what we call the digital marketing and adtech industry, use this information to track us over time and across devices, in order to create comprehensive profiles about individual consumers. In turn, these profiles and groups can be used to personalize and target advertising, but also for other purposes such as discrimination, manipulation, and exploitation. Although the adtech industry operates across different media such as websites, smart devices, and mobile apps, we chose to focus on adtech in apps.

In order to expose how large parts of this vast industry works, we commissioned the cybersecurity company Mnemonic to perform a technical analysis of the data traffic from ten popular mobile apps. Because of the scope of tests, size of the third parties that were observed receiving data, and popularity of the apps, we regard the findings from these tests to be representative of widespread practices in the adtech industry.

[Report: Out of Control](https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2020-01-14-out-of-control-final-version.pdf) [Technical report – Out of Control](https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/mnemonic-security-test-report-v1.0.pdf)



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**TECHNICAL REPORT**

**“OUT OF CONTROL” – A REVIEW OF DATA SHARING BY POPULAR MOBILE APPS**

Norwegian Consumer Council

**Place** Oslo

**Date** 14.01.2020

**Version** 1.0

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“Out of Control” – A review of data sharing by popular mobile apps - Norwegian Consumer Council mnemonic

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**Report summary**

**Introduction**

As part of an ongoing collaboration with the digital consumer rights team at the Norwegian Consumer Council (NCC), mnemonic researchers have carried out an in-depth investigation into how mobile applications share data with third parties for advertising purposes. The analysis has covered a selection of 10 popular mobile applications on the Android platform.

The purpose of the testing has been to increase our understanding of the mobile advertising ecosystem. In particular, we have aimed to identify some of the main actors collecting user data from our sample set of apps, understand the type and frequency of data flows, and examine the specific information that is being transmitted.

A key motivation for this project has been that data collection, sharing, and processing within the advertising industry on mobile platforms is poorly understood by the general public, policy-makers, and the tech community. One of our main goals has been to help clarify this topic.

All the apps have been analysed in mnemonic’s mobile testing lab, where we have set up infrastructure to monitor and capture communications from our test device. The project has been carried out between May and December 2019, with the majority of testing in July and August.

From our testing, we have collected a large amount of mobile traffic data, while working without any inside knowledge of the data collection ecosystems. The vast volumes, as well as the nature of black-box analysis, has made it hard to interpret the data and get a complete picture of the situation. This report documents data collection and sharing practices which appear highly problematic in terms of data privacy and consent. However, these findings are by no means exhaustive. We hope that this report may serve as the beginning of a debate on mobile advertising practices, rather than the final word.

**Summary of findings**

Some of the key findings in this report are:

1. All apps tested share user data with multiple third parties, and all but one share data beyond the device advertising ID. This includes information such as the IP address and GPS position of the user, personal attributes such as gender and age, and app activities such as GUI events. In many cases, this information can be used to infer attributes such as sexual orientation or religious belief.

2. The **Grindr** app shares detailed user data with a very large number of third parties, including IP address, GPS location, age, and gender. By using **MoPub** as a mediator, the data sharing is highly opaque as neither the third parties nor the information transmitted are not known in advance. We have also seen that **MoPub** can enrich the data that is shared with other parties dynamically.

3. The **Perfect365** app shares user data with a very large number of third parties, including attributes such as advertising ID, IP address, and GPS position. One could almost say that the app appears to be built to collect and share as much user data as possible.

4. The **MyDays** app shares the user’s GPS location with multiple parties, and the **OkCupid** app shares detailed personal questions and answers with **Braze**.

During testing, more than **88.000 web requests** made by the apps were logged and analysed, covering **216 unique domains** and at least **135 third parties** within the advertising space.

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Figure 1 visualises the data flows observed for companies who receive data from multiple apps.

*Figure 1. Advertising companies receiving data from multiple apps*

**About mnemonic**

mnemonic helps businesses manage their security risks, protect their data and defend against cyber threats. Our expert team of security consultants, product specialists, threat researchers, incident responders and ethical hackers, combined with our Argus security platform ensures we stay ahead of advanced cyberattacks and protect our customers from evolving threats.

Acknowledged by Gartner as a notable vendor in delivering Managed Security Services, threat intelligence and advanced targeted attack detection, we are among the largest IT security service providers in Europe, the preferred security partner of the region’s top companies and a trusted source of threat intelligence to Europol and other law enforcement agencies globally.

With intelligence-driven managed security services, 185+ security experts and partnerships with leading security vendors, mnemonic enables businesses to stay secure and compliant while reducing costs.

This is the second major collaboration between the NCC and mnemonic, the first being the #WatchOut1 investigation into the cybersecurity of smart watches for children in 2017.

1 Published as https://www.forbrukerradet.no/side/significant-security-flaws-in-smartwatches-for-children/ and https://mnemonic.no/watchout on October 18th, 2017

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**1 Introduction**

**1.1 Introduction to the report**

mnemonic has carried out an in-depth investigation of 10 popular mobile apps, focusing on the type and amount of personal data that is being shared with third parties for advertising purposes. The purpose of the testing has been to gain knowledge about how the mobile advertising ecosystem works, in terms of data sharing and communication patterns, and document concrete examples of how user data is being collected and shared as part of app monetization.

All the testing carried out as part of this research has been done on Google’s Android platform, with apps downloaded from the Google Play store. This was a practical decision made early on in the project, based on the fact that it would require significant additional effort to cover additional platforms such as iOS, and that the Android platform has by far the highest market share in the smartphone market globally2. Another factor is that Google plays a significant role in online advertising, although this has not been a primary focus of the research.

2 Domestically in Norway, the respective market shares of Android and Apple’s iOS are estimated to be roughly equal, although precise numbers are not known to us. Globally, Android is known to have the largest market share, estimated at about 75%.

3 The NCC’s full report and additional information about the project can be obtained at https://www.forbrukerradet.no/out-of-control/

Our tests have covered 10 apps that are well-known and widely used, which were selected for analysis by the Norwegian Consumer Council. The apps cover a number of highly personal topics, such as dating, religion, and health. Chapter 1.2 provides a list of the specific apps and versions tested.

The results of our testing document that a significant degree of user data, including personal data, is being shared from the apps with third parties in the advertising or “adtech” industry. We expect that our results will be widely applicable to other people in Norway, using the same apps during the same time as the testing was carried out. We also expect that the findings are broadly generalizable within the EU / EEA. Privacy controls on the iOS platform are more stringent than on Android, but we expect that some of the findings would also apply there.

This report describes the results of the technical testing in further detail, providing evidence of our findings, as well as mnemonic’s initial analysis and evaluation. Due to the sheer volume of data, as well as the presence of some personal data related to location in the datasets, the underlying raw data from our analysis is not included as part of the report.

For additional contextual information about the mobile advertising industry, and higher-level analysis of the findings, we refer to the Norwegian Consumer Council’s technical report, *Out of Control – How consumers are exploited by the online advertising industry 3*, which is published as a companion to this work.

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**1.2 Apps tested by mnemonic**

mnemonic has tested 10 popular mobile apps on the Android platform. The apps are listed and categorised in Table 1.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **App** | **Package name** | **Category** |
| Grindr | com.grindrapp.android | Gay dating |
| Perfect365 | com.arcsoft.perfect365 | Virtual makeup |
| My Days | com.chris.mydays | Period tracker |
| OkCupid | com.okcupid.okcupid | Online dating |
| My Talking Tom 2 | com.outfit7.mytalkingtom2 | Children’s app |
| Muslim: Qibla Finder | com.hundred.qibla | Muslim assistant |
| Tinder | com.tinder | Online dating |
| Clue | com.clue.android | Period tracker |
| Happn | com.ftw\_and\_co.happn | Online dating |
| Wave Keyboard | com.wave.keyboard | Keyboard themes |

**Complaints against Grindr and five third party companies**

14. januar, 2020

The Norwegian Consumer Council is filing formal complaints against Grindr and five companies that were receiving personal data through the app;  Twitter`s MoPub, AT&T’s AppNexus, OpenX, AdColony and Smaato.

The complaints are a part of the project «Out of control» and are directed to the Norwegian Data Protection Agency for breaches of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

[Complaint 1. against Grindr, Twitter MoPub, AppNexus and OpenX](https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200114-complaint-grindr-twitter-mopub-appnexus-openx.pdf) [Complaint 2. against Grindr and AdColony](https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200114-complaint-grindr-adcolony.pdf) [Complaint against 3. Grindr and Smaato](https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200114-complaint-grindr-smaato.pdf)